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DOCUMENT 756 
Draft Recommendation 
on WBU'a contribution to the development of European union 
The Assembly, 
Considering that Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty contains a binding commitment to 
automatic military assistance ; 
Convinced that application of this provision, as of Article VIII, calls for close and continuing 
consultations between its signatories on external policy and defence questions ; 
Further convinced that only full application of the treaty can maintain mutual confidence, which 
gives full deterrent value to Article V ; 
Considering that neither the North Atlantic Council nor, in present circumstances, the political 
consultations organised between members of the EEC are able to replace entirely the consultations provided 
for in the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly under Article VIII; 
Considering that the modified Brussels Treaty has introduced a new ethical dimension into relations 
between signatory States ; 
Considering that the mandate given to the Standing Armaments Committee by the Council on 31st 
May 1976 should make a substantial contribution to: 
(a) paving the way towards a harmonisation of armaments with a view to protecting the production 
capability of industries which are essential for maintaining employment and safeguarding the 
independence of member countries ; 
(b) preparing a joint policy for member countries in respect of sales of arms, which might lead to 
disarmament ; 
Deploring the fact that in practice the Council takes no account of these considerations ; 
Convinced that a future European union can be based only on treaties and institutions associating 
member countries, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Examine to what extent the modified Brussels Treaty is really applied by organisations other than 
WEU; 
2. Implement Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty whenever the international situation so 
requires, i.e. consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace or to economic 
stability; 
3. Examine the implications of Article V for all member States, with the aim inter alia of harmonising 
strategic concepts and strengthening procedure for consultation ; 
4. In the context of the search for universal, progressive and controlled disarmament, consider how 
WEU can contribute to the establishment of lasting peace; 
5. Ensure that the task given to the Standing Armaments Committee is pursued promptly and 
efficiently and is extended to cover the sale of arms with a view to making meaningful progress towards 
general and complete disarmament ; 
6. Meet the wish regularly expressed by the Assembly to hold a true dialogue on the various aspects 
of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty ; 
7. Give favourable consideration to the possibility of revising Article IX of the treaty so as to allow 
better participation by members of parliament in the work of the Assembly. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr~ Forni,' Rapp·orteur) 
I. European union and defence 
1. While it might have seemed possible ten 
years ago to project the shape of Europe in the 
near or more distant future on the basis of earlier 
conceptS and extrapolations starting from the 
Rome Treaty and its preamble, any such attempt 
today would be difficult and hazardous. The 
nine EEC countries have admittedly agreed to call 
the goal of their joint undertaking "European 
union", but both the substance and the shape 
of this European union are increasingly un-
certain. 
2. Spain and Greece wish to join the Economic 
Community without delay. Others such as Turkey 
wish to strengthen their links with the Com-
munity with a view to future membership. Yet 
others are prepared to co-operate closely with 
their neighbours in economic matters but do not 
wish to engage in political or military under-
takings. 
3. Community Europe will probably have to be 
enlarged in the next ten years and this will bring 
with it wide-ranging changes in the present Euro-
pean system, particularly in agriculture. But 
many other aspects of the European undertaking 
may need revision, perhaps because of enlarge-
ment or because of internal developments in 
member States or because of changes in inter-
national society and the balance of political, 
economic or military forces, not to mention fore-
seeable or unforeseeable developments in the 
crisis with which the capitalist world has been at 
grips since 1973 and which shows every sign of 
becoming worse rather than better in years to 
come. The EEC, which was set up at a time when 
steady, rapid economic progress was an accepted 
fact, seems to be having greater difficulty than 
member States in adjusting its economic and 
trade policy to the demands of the crisis. 
4. The last attempt to explore if not to define 
the substance of the future European union was 
the Tindemans report. This provided a basis fpr 
a number of discussions in the European Council, 
h11t it very soon became apparent that it was 
~estin:ed to f~ll into oblivion. · 
5. For instance, the proposal to include defence 
among the responsibilities and activities of the 
European union met with· a host of objections: 
The thought of extending the responsibilities of 
the European Parliament at the expense of the 
WEU Assembly seems_ to have been endorsed. by 
none of the governments. The only point on 
which the nine governments managed to agree 
was that the European Parliament should be 
elected by direct universaL suffrage before sum-
mer 1978. But now it is not at all clear that the 
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nine countries will be able to agree on electoral 
procedure or on a date. Some are wondering 
whether it will be p<)ssible to hold elections within 
the prescribed time limits. 
6; While the era of high-flung speculation about 
the future of Europe now seems over, it is clearer 
than ever that the future European union, if it 
is ever to see the d!ly, can be based only on what 
already exists where treaties and institutions are 
concerned. But one way or another the modified 
Brussels Treaty is the only sound basis for a 
common defence policy. 
7. On 5th August 1977, the WEU Council 
answered written question 176 put by a British 
member of parliament in the following terms : 
"There can be no doubt about the binding 
character of the automatic mutual assistance 
cLause in Article V of the modified Brussels 
Treaty, which constitutes a commitment in 
international law." 
This means that the seven governments agree to 
interpret Article V of the modified Bru~ls 
Treaty as an "automatic" commitment clause 
leaving no margin of interpretation of what may 
be covered by the word "attack". Without any-
thing else, this statement determines the role of 
WEU and particularly of its Council, since there 
can be no such commitment if policies are not 
closely concerted: it is impossible for States to 
envisage "automatic" military commitment with-
out first agreeing on the main aspects of their 
defence policies and on the direction of their 
foreign policies. Failing this, all the signatories 
of the pact would be committed by each other's 
actions and might find themselves having to 
condone policies of which they might not approve. 
8. However this may be, Western Europe 
stands as one in face of the vital need to avoid 
at any cost a war which, whatever arms may be 
used, conventional or nuclear, would bring total 
ruin. Therefore, while there may be wide diver-
gences between the defence ·policies of the 
Western European countries, they draw close 
. together in their recognition of the need for a 
deterrent. It is no secret that today only nuclear 
weapons can provide a deterrent capable of 
making a possible enemy renounce the use of 
force because of. the risk of incurring intolerable 
deStruction' on his .owli territory. It alSo implies 
a desire to defend oneself by evezj means in the 
event of an attack and also a strategy, i.e. a 
doctrine for the. use of nuclear weapons to make 
them the instrument of a policy of deterrence 
rather than of war. 
9. Thus, de facto solidarity, the need for a 
deterrent defence policy and divergences between 
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the defence policies of European States determine 
the framework of WEU. It must continually con· 
sider how passive solidarity can be transformed 
into active solidarity by deterrent action in the 
general interest but for which defence policies 
based on different assessments of the situation 
must be harmonised. Thus France, which is no 
longer a member of NATO and will very probably 
continue to pursue an independent defence policy, 
is essential to the security of Western Europe 
because of its geographical position and the exis-
tence of its nuclear force, just as Western Europe 
- and in particular the Federal Republic of 
Germany - is essential to the security of France. 
10. The French Socialist Party, for its part, has 
clearly and on several occasions given its views 
on associating the national nuclear force with 
this solidarity and most recently in an interview 
with Robert Pontillon in Le Point of lOth October 
1977: 
" ... The claim to wish to defend national ter-
ritory alone means refusing to take account 
of undertakings stemming from France's 
adhesion to the Brussels or Paris Treaties, 
and I intentionally refrain from mention-
ing the North Atlantic Treaty which does 
not make the commitment of forces auto-
matic. 
But for us there is no sense in France with-
drawing behind its frontiers. The 'threat', 
as the military say, can be in two forms : 
direct pressure on our frontiers or on the 
frontiers of countries of the Alliance to 
which we belong. By leaving the Alliance, 
we would accept that our neighbours may be 
attacked without a move on our part and 
that we should defend ourselves alone. in 
the event of a direct threat to our frontiers. 
This is unthinkable. 
When Mitterrand says that he does not 
believe in a national deterrent, it is because 
he believes in the alliances and for him 
national deterrence means nothing if it is 
not included in a system of alliances and 
solidarity. 
What Mitterrand says is that even with a 
national strike foree France cannot argue 
its case in isolation from its alliances ... " 
11. A union of countries pursuing very different 
defence policies would be meaninglem without a 
political expression of their solidarity and so far 
there is no other than the modified Brussels 
Treaty. This, and hence WEU itself, is thus the 
common element serving the security of all in a 
deterrent which each one exercises with the means 
available to it : integration of conventional forees 
in NATO for some, an independent policy with 
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the support of a nuclear force in the case of 
France. 
D. Defence policy 
12. From the very beginning, the exereise of 
most of the WEU Council's military tasks was 
handed over to NATO. It lost many of its econ-
omic activities when the United Kingdom joined 
the European Communities and much of its 
political work when nine-power political con-
sultations began. The Council of Ministers has 
spaced out its meetings and now considers only 
fairly secondary matters. Nor is there any great 
political activity at meetings of the Permanent 
Council. However, the WEU Council has not 
thereby lost any of the responsibilities assigned 
to it under the modified Brussels Treaty which 
is still essential in view of present uncertainty 
about the future of Europe. 
13. Even in the near future, it is not out of the 
question that internal developments in certain 
member countries might make their relations 
with the American partners in the North Atlantic 
Treaty far more difficuLt, either because the 
United States would not be prepared to accept 
the participation of communists in these countries' 
governments or because the course adopted by 
a new· majority in their economic, social, trade 
or even defence policy would not be appreciated 
across the Atlantic. Moreover, the achievement 
of an economic and social policy in conformity 
with the interests of the peoples of these coun-
tries might make them stand apart from Com-
munity Europe, dominated by the ideology of 
free enterprise, for there could be no question 
of a democratically-chosen government subordi-
nating its economic and social policy to foreign 
policy considerations. 
14. In any event, a French majority, whatever 
it may be, will have to take account of the de 
facto solidarity between France and its partners 
and will consequently have to maintain and 
develop, in the framework of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty, consultations and co-operation with 
the European members of NATO, which will 
have to be intensified as France moves further 
away from NATO. In such a case, the WEU 
Council may have to resume its role as a 
link between one country of Western Europe 
and the principal European members of the 
Atlantic Alliance as it did in the days when the 
United Kingdom was outside the EEC. WEU's 
intergovernmental character can but encourage 
action in this field which would be out of the 
question for a supposedly supranational organisa-
tion. 
15. Consequently, this does not mean major 
changes in the immediate future, but rather the 
maintenance of what exists, it being particularly 
el'Sential to be able to resort to the Council since 
it provides the basis for all the activities of WEU. 
But the Council must continue to fulfil effect-
ively the role incumbent on it under the modified 
Brussels Treaty. 
16. Yet, the WEU Council as it now operates 
does not appear to be taking its tasks seriously. 
It is just as if the seven governments have agreed 
not to touch the modified Brussels Treaty or to 
apply it only in a most restricted manner to a 
point that one may wonder whether they really 
apply it. In fact, the Council's annual report to 
the Assembly shows quite clearly that the Council 
is doing practically nothing to keep itself infor-
med of matters which are within its terms of 
reference but are supposed to be exercised else-
where. It hardly wonders to what extent its 
responsibilities are in fact being exercised by 
other bodies. For instance, it is evident that 
France's non-participation in certain NATO 
activities makes it impossible for the latter to 
exercise in full the responsibilities assigned to 
the WEU Council by the Brussels Treaty. Has 
the Council ever done anything to make up for 
this lacuna 7 
17. The question therefore arises as to why the 
Council systematically adopts a restrictive view 
of its commitments and thus does not really 
respect the treaty it is responsible for applying, 
nor the promises it has itself made to the 
Assembly concerning inter alia the information 
it must furnish, nor even certain decisions it 
has taken such as that of 31st May 1976 confer-
ring a mandate on the Standing Armaments 
Committee. 
18. Admittedly, it is realised that all the govern-
ments agree that NATO, the Nine and the inde-
pendent European programme group allow them 
to consider together in wider forums than that 
of the WEU Council matters which concern the 
application of the modified Brussels Treaty and 
that they are anxious to avoid duplication and 
make rational use of the multilateral consultative 
bodies at their disposal. However, this is not 
enough to explain the deliberately passive atti-
tude adopted by the Council and its steadfast 
wish not to implement any of its treaty responsi-
bilities other than those which concern its rela-
tions with the Assembly. Even this shows evidence 
of ill-will in the brevity of its replies to recom-
mendations and written questions, the growing 
poverty of its annual report and its reluctance 
whenever there is question of implementing the 
procedure for a dialogue with the Assembly. In 
short, everything indicates that the seven govern-
ments are aiming at progressively killing off a 
treaty which they still claim to respect but which 
they are in fact emptying of substance. There 
is, for instance, every reason to suspect that they 
discouraged any attempt by Greece and Turkey 
to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty. It may 
5 
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therefore be wondered whether there are other 
reasons for the Council's attitude. Three possible 
types of motivation may be considered, although 
it is not possible to determine just how decisive 
each one may be for each member country, for 
it is not sure that they all have the same motives, 
even if the resulting inertia is the same. 
19. (i) The fact that certain member countries 
rely mainly on American strength to ensure their 
security encourages them to give priority to 
NATO rather than any collective security organ-
isation to which the United States does not 
belong. They even seem afraid that the United 
States may take offence at the smooth operation 
of any truly European defence organisation, 
which explains the cold reception given to Mr. 
Tindemans' proposals on defence matters and 
the mediocre results of attempts made on the 
fringes of NATO, such as Eurogroup and the 
independent European programme group, to 
work out a European armaments policy or the 
hardly-vei!led wish in some quarters to reduce 
WEU's activities as far as possible. When it 
visited Norway and Denmark, the General 
Affairs Committee was able to see how wary 
these countries were of any European initiative 
in defence matters. It is not certain that the 
attitude of all the members of WEU is very 
different to that of the Norwegians and the 
Danes. 
20. (ii) The modified Brussels Treaty involves 
different obligations for the various member 
countries, which has given some of them to believe 
that it was discriminatory at their expense. For 
instance, the United Kingdom is not allowed to 
withdraw forces from Germany without the agree-
ment of its allies. There are ceilings on certain 
armaments that the Federal Republic may manu-
facture or possess. It is not difficult to under-
stand why such countries find commitments or 
bans· of this kind hard to bear and deplore the 
fact that their association with Western Europe 
in defence matters is linked to such discrimina-
tion, since the United Kingdom has to ask its 
allies for authorisation before moving any troops 
from the mainland of Europe to Ireland, and 
the Federal Republic has to face lengthy pro-
cedure every time it wishes to build certain types 
of ship. 
21. The reason for such unequal treatment prob-
ably resides in the special position of each Euro-
pean country at the time of the negotiations 
which led to the modification of the Brussels 
Treaty in 1954. However, some overall balance 
is to be found since, although the United King-
dom agreed to special commitments, its territory 
is not subject to the limits and controls imposed 
on the countries on the mainland of Europe, 
while the Federal Republic which, because of 
its situation, is Europe's most sensitive point, is 
subject to particular constraints. In short, the 
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discrimination found in the modified Brussels 
Treaty is less evident if all its provisions are 
considered than if the parts applying to one or 
other signatory are considered. 
22. (iii) The existence of an amembly, where the 
parliaments of member countries are represented 
relatively fairly, obviously disturbs the govern-
ments, which are anxious to keep their external 
policy at a discreet distance beyond the reach 
of demonstrations of public opinion. AH relations 
between the Council and the Assembly are 
branded by this taste for diplomatic secrecy, a 
long-standing tradition,_ admittedly, but also 
essential for camouflaging action abroad which 
is often a long shot from principles voiced at 
home. The new factor brought into international 
relations by the modified Brussels Treaty was 
precisely the element of parliamentary super-
vision in the day-to-day life of a defensive 
alliance, the aim being to ensure democracy in 
Europe, whose institutional foundatio~ were 
just being laid. But in practice the Council seems 
to be intent on depriving the organisation of 
substance and ~he governments seem to prefer 
organisations which are more discreet than WEU. 
23. Whatever their reasons, it is clear that the 
governments are deliberately keeping the Council 
in a state of semi-lethargy and that the latter 
is doing nothing it could and should do to apply 
the modified Brussels Treaty effectively, i.e. : 
(a) 
(b) 
keep itself informed about how· matters 
within its competence are being dealt 
with or not in other bodies and take 
upon itself to do what others -are not 
doing satisfactorily in the foreign policy 
and defence fields ; 
keep the Assembly suitably informed 
about what is being done elsewhere and 
to this end reach agreement with the 
organisations concerned for the com-
munication of information that may be 
transmitted to the Assembly ; 
(c) implement the protocols on armed forces 
and the control of armaments, not only 
in the routine, bureaucratic and super-
ficial manner which is now the rule but 
bearing in mind their implications for 
a European defence policy ; 
(d) establish a European armaments policy, 
taking account of the requirements of 
joint defence and the economic. and 
social possibilities and requirements of 
each member country ; 
(e) prepare measures for applying Article 
VII, paragraph 3, of the treaty which 
makes it incumbent on the Council : 
"... to consuLt with regard to any 
situation which may constitute a 
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threat to peace, in whatever area 
this threat should arise, or a danger 
to economic stability" ; 
(f) endorse the Assembly's efforts to study 
and reflect upon aH the problems raised 
by Europe's security and to prepare for 
the rationalisation of European bodies 
active in defence matters in anticipation 
of the time when it will be possible to 
include these questions in the framework 
of a European IUlion. 
III. Level of forces, limitation and control of 
armaments 
24. It is evident that the situation which 
induced the signatories of the Brussels Treaty 
to prescribe procedure for limiting the level of 
member countries' armed forces and to create the 
Agency for the Control of Arrriaments in 1954 
is not at all the same today. Other factors now 
advocate maintaining multilateral control of 
armaments. 
25. First, the limits and control contribute to 
the level of confidence in the Alliance. For 
instance, the fact that it 'is incumbent on the 
United Kingdom under the treaty not to reduce 
the level of its forces stationed on the mainland 
of Europe without the agreement of all its 
partners is an essential token of confidence in 
European solidarity and a major factor of 
deterrence since it is evident to any possible 
aggressor that it links the United Kingdom to 
the defence of the continent. 
26. Second, the control system, which seems to 
be applied satisfactorily, might if necessary form 
a useful brake on an undue increase in arma-
ments by one or other signatory country. It 
guarantees that none of these countries can be 
suspected of wishing to follow a course of aggres-
sion inside or outside Europe. 
27. The existence of armaments control, includ-
ing inter alia the treaty provisions concerning 
the Federal Republic of Germany, makes a 
valuable contribution to detente because it 
protects the members of WEU against slander 
campaigns which might provide a pretext for 
accelerating the armaments policy of their 
eastern neighbours and demonstrates that the 
defence of Western Europe is indivisible. 
28. The fact that Western Europe's armaments 
are subject to a controlled agreement allows the 
WEU countries to tackle problems of security 
and co-operation in Europe and disarmament 
problems in the best conditions. It may be hoped 
that these matters will he considered in a more 
positive manner in the coming years in the 
context of more general and complete disarma-
ment than hitherto. Then the Agency might 
constitute a model for a wider and more ambi-
tious organisation, for the degree of perfection 
to which it has raised its methods of controlling 
armaments is probably unequalled. In short, the 
maintenance and pursuit of the Agency's activi-
ties may, in the future, be a very useful con-
tribution to a policy of detente and peace. 
29. However, the Agency will not be able to 
play its full role unless all the signatories of the 
modified B~ls Treaty are prepared to fulfil 
all their ·commitments. 
30. At present, Article III of Protocol No. III 
on the control of armaments is nat applied by 
one of the signatory countries, i.e. France, which 
has moreover apparently never been ·asked to do 
so by its partners. This article reads as follows : 
"''When the development of atomic, biological 
and chemical weapons in the territory on 
the mainland of Europe of the High Con-
tracting Parties who have nat given up the 
right to produce them has passed the 
experimental stage and effective production 
of them has started there, the level of stocks 
that the High Contracting Parties concerned 
will be allowed to hold on the mainland of 
Europe shall be decided by a majority vote 
of the Council of Western European 
Union." 
31. It is clear that French nuclear armaments 
have now "passed the experimental stage", but 
France is subject to neither authorisation for 
nor control over these weapons. Very probably, 
if its partners have nat asked it to apply the 
protocol, it is because they are fully aware of 
the reasons why France could not comply. These 
reasons are clear enough. On the one hand, they 
stem from tlie fuct that nuclear weapons have a 
deterrent effect only if they are in the hands 
of a purely national authority, alone capable of 
taking decisions on the use of such weapons ; 
on the other hand, there is the disagreement 
between France and its partners over NATO. In 
other words, France does not wish to risk being 
deprived of its nuclear weapons or restricted in 
their possible use by a decision of its partners. 
But, rightly or wrongly, it suspects some of ita 
partners of subordinating their decisions on the 
defence of Europe to their concern to give the 
United States every satisfaction it might wish 
in return for its military protection of Western 
Europe. For a long time1 there has been no doubt 
about the United States' hostility towards 
France's nuclear weapons and it could rightly be 
feared that it might use the means available to 
it to encourage lt,rance's partners in WEU to 
put a brake on France's nuclear weapons since 
it has never approved of another member of the 
Atlantic Alliance having an independent 
decision-taking ability in respect of the use of 
the deterrent. 
7 
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32. Today, some of France's partners are Cer-
tainly less hostile than in the past to French 
nuclear weapons. At its meeting in Ottawa on 
19th June 1974, the North Atlantic Council even 
said that: 
" ... The European members who provide 
three-quarters of the conventional strength 
of the Alliance in Europe, and two of whom 
possess nuclear forces capable of playing a 
deterrent role of their own contributing to 
the overall strengthening of the deterrence 
of the Alliance, undertake to make the 
necessary contribution to maintain the com-
mon defence at a level capable of deterring 
and if necessary repelling all actions 
directed against the independence and ter-
ritorial integrity of the members of the 
Alliance." 
33. However, it may still be wondered whether 
all the governments participating in NATO were 
sincere in Ottawa. In particular, it is !mown 
that the Netherlands Government implied that 
this part of the Ottawa declaration hardly eon-
corded with its views. 
34. Indeed, replying to a question put by Mr. 
Wattmans on 23rd December 1975, Mr. van der 
Stoel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 
Netherlands, said: 
"Every one of us has had to put up with a 
phrase here or there which he might not 
have written if this declaration had been a 
unilateral one. One of the most difficult 
paragraphs for my government has been the 
one dealing with the nuclear forces of cer-
tain European allies. I have finally accepted 
the present formula ·as a statement of fact 
and in order not to stand in the way of a 
consensus, but in doing so I must stress, 
once again, that in my opinion nothing in 
the declaration can be construed as support 
by my government for the idea of a Euro-
pean nuclear force, an idea which is to the 
Netherlands, now as before, unacceptable." 
35. Nuclear weapons are a sufficiently seriou8 
matter for a country which has chosen to develop 
them and for many years made the necessary 
effort to have a full and sophisticated range not 
to be able to leave it to an international forum 
to decide on their possible limitation or abandon-
ment. The French socialists and communists, 
who were for a long time against the development 
of French nuclear weapons, can no longer 
disregard their existence. They have turned their 
thoughts to the search for means of using these 
weapons as a factor of security, peace and 
disarmament. As matters now stand, they rtoo 
could not leave it to a majority of the members 
of WEU to take decisions which are essential for 
France's defence policy. 
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36. Conversely, if it were seen ·that France's 
partners were really applying the spirit and the 
letter of the modified Brussels Treaty and of the 
Ottawa declaration, i.e. if they were prepared to 
consider, with France, and without being in-
fluenced from outside all the problems relating 
to the defence and security of Europe, in other 
words to make the WEU Council's activities 
correspond to its responsibilities, a French 
Government representing the true ambitions of 
the people and aware of the de /Q.~;to solidarity 
linking the defence of France with that of 
Europe might then consider applying Article III 
of Protocol No. III. But there can be no question 
of solidarity being one-way: if France's partners 
are convinced that French nuclear weapons con-
tribute to Europe's security, as they declared in 
Ottawa, they too must come to grips with the 
consequences and demonstrate that they too take 
seriously the prospect of a real policy for the 
defence of Europe by Europeans. 
37. It might moreover be added that such a 
choice would also put an end to the mistrust 
which is constantly re-emerging among Euro-
pean countries, and in particular, between the 
Federal Republic and its partners. For instance, 
in recent months there have been accusations in 
the French press (L'Express, 22nd-28th August 
1977) that the Federal Republic had evaded the 
provisions of the modified Bl'U&Sels Treaty by 
producing missiles in Zaire which might be used 
for military as well as for civil purposes and 
which thus escaped the WEU limits and con-
trols. On the building of two tankers needed by 
the federal navy, the German press (W ehrtech-
nik, September 1977) complained, inter alia 
about the slowness of WEU procedure used by 
the Federal Republic's partners ro force it to 
purchase these tankers abroad. How valid are 
these accusations Y Your Rapporteur cannot say, 
but they reveal mistrust which would be perfectly 
unjustified if the de facto solidarity uniting 
the Western European countries became active 
solidarity. 
38. It is not by turning down the tone of 
reciprocal accusations or by trying to satisfy the 
complaints of the other side one by one that 
France and Federal Germany will manage to 
overcome the differences voi<led by public 
opinion in the two countries in recent months 
but by re-establishing confidence based on a 
shared conviction that the two countries are 
pursuing a common aim. 
39. Finally - and your Rapporteur considers 
this essential- while the first aim of a defence 
policy is to be effective, i.e. deterrent, it must 
also meet certain ethical standards and not 
merely the requirements of total pragmatism. 
Armaments are only a means and care must be 
taken to avoid this means becoming an end for 
States with all the dangers that involves for 
world peace. In this respect, the modified Brus. 
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sels Treaty was an innovation by "moralising" 
so to say the necessary armaments policy. This 
is one of the reasons why the task of limiting 
and controlling levels of forces and armaments, 
of which it was the first step, must be main-
tained, pursued and strengthened, for peace and 
disarmament are the primary interests of all. 
IV. Armaments production 
40. During the 1954 negotiations which led to 
the modification of the Brussels Treaty, France 
was the one to propose that WEU's responsibili-
ties be extended to cover matters relating to 
armaments production. France's partners appear 
to have greeted Mr. Mendes-France's proposals 
in this sense with some scepticism, traCES of 
which are to be found in the pages of Lord 
Avon's memoirs on this matter. However, they 
agreed to the creation of the Standing Arma-
ments Committee to promote the joint produc-
tion of armaments by the WEU member coun-
tries. 
41. Their scepticism now appears only too justi-
fied in view of the work accomplished by the 
SAC, but this is due largely to the total absence 
of determination to succeed shown by the seven 
governments in this connection. However, on 31st 
May 1976, the Council, following initiatives 
taken in the Assembly by Mr. Jobert and Mr. 
Van Elslande, decided to confer a new task on 
the SAC. 
42. The decision taken in 1976 to reactivate the 
Standing Armaments Committee led the Assem-
bly to put frequent questions to the Council on 
its intentions in taking this decision. It is now 
clear that while the independent European pro-
gramme group is still closely linked with an 
Atlantic view of defence requirements, although 
administratively it is independent of NATO, the 
role of the SAC can be defined in relation to 
the European armaments industries rather than 
to a defence policy. 
43. Until the enquiries conducted by the SAC 
have led to a published report, it is difficult to 
say what this role will be. But it can already be 
foreseen that one of its aims will be to remove 
the obstacles to dividing work between European 
industries rationally enough to allow worthwhile 
reductions in the cost price of arimlliilents by 
lowering operational and marketing expenses as 
well as investments, without Europe's defence 
potential suffering. Secondly, a remedy will have 
to be found for the difficulties to which the 
European industries are subjected because the 
crisis in the capitalist world favours large non-
European manufacturers. 
44. Including sub-contracting, the WEU coun-
tries' armaments industries employ almost a mil-
lion persons. If a determined effort to cut 
expenditure on armaments is not accompanied 
by an organisation of production, a large pro-
portion of these workers would become un-
employed and Europe's armaments research 
capability would gradually dry up. 
45. Finally, several European countries have 
had to try to compensate the smallness of their 
national markets and the difficulty of penetra~ 
ing the markets of their partners by selling arms 
to African, Asian or South American countries, 
thus accelerating the arms race in those areas. 
The fast increase in the price of oil since 1973 
has added to the arms-producing countries' 
determination to sell and improve the purchasing 
capacity of their customers. This matter needs 
sorting out, as President Carter recently under-
lined, but this is hardly possible unless a code 
of good behaviour is drawn up between arms-
producing countries. 
46. Here too the SAC might play an important 
role if it does not limit its ambitions to purely 
industrial organisation but considers the overall 
problem of arms sales with a view to reaching a 
common definition of principles seeking to 
reduce the scale of arms sales and prevent them 
from upsetting the balance and fanning the 
flames of conflicts outside Europe. 
47. On lOth September 1977, the important 
Hamburg newspaper Die Welt gave a parti-
cularly remarkable eX'ample of the effects of 
joint production on the currently prevailing 
anarchy in the sale of European armaments to 
the developing countries. According to Die Welt, 
a number of Middle Eastern countries were be-
lieved to have signed a contract with the French 
manufacturer of the Alpha-Jet, Marcel Dassault, 
for 200 aircraft of this type. This aircraft is a . 
co-production of D~ult in France and Dornier 
in the Federal Republic, but the French Govern-
ment was prepared to sell aircraft to these coun-
tries to which the Government of the Federal 
Republic considered it undesirable to supply 
military equipment of this kind. But the Federal 
Government could not prevent Dornier from 
delivering German-manufactured parts for the 
aircraft to its French associate, which allowed 
the Dornier-Dassault consortium to circumvent 
the decisions of the Federal Government, just 
as it could if necessary circumvent decisions of 
the French Government. 
48. This example shows that in the absence of 
adequate intergovernmental consultations co-
production can be a way for industrialists to 
evade control by governments, already not very 
inclined to restrict sales of arms to under-
developed countries. An essential aspect of the 
SAC's mandate -might thus be to work out pro-
cedure to prevent industrialists from acting in 
this way by creating a European office for the 
armaments trade to harmonise principles and 
practice in selling countries with a view to 
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preventing unrestrained competition leading to 
the over-arming of countries whose only real 
priority should be economic development. This 
would be a major contribution to general and 
complete disarmament. 
49. Generally speaking, the SAC's mandate, 
which is economic rather than military, the latter 
field being left to the independent European 
programme group, should eventually place it in 
the framework of the future European union 
rather than NATO, making it something of an 
extension of the Community institutions to the 
armaments field. 
50. But this is only one course. The effe·ctiveness 
of the SAC's work will depend solely on the 
determination of governments, to organise the 
European armaments industry in order to rescue 
it from its present crisis and to lay down 
industrial, social and commercial standards with 
which they would be prepared to comply. As 
long as this determination is not manifest, the 
charter of the Standing Armaments Committee, 
like the decision of 31st May 1976, will remain a 
dead letter. 
.51. One of the prospects offered by Mr. Mendes.. 
France in 1954 when he proposed creating the 
SAC was in fact to limit competition, organise 
production and prevent the development of anar-
chy in the sale of arms. Twenty-three years later, 
it is time for the seven governments to abandon 
the ambiguous positions behind which they have 
been constantly hiding to paralyse the SA:C and 
say whether they really have the political will 
to inject life into this body. 
V. The parliamentary dimension 
52. The WEU Assembly will continue to be 
distinct from other European parliamentary 
assemblies not only because of its responsibilities 
but also because of its membership. Whereas the 
North Atlantic Assembly represents only very 
partially the parliaments of the member coun-
tries of the Atlantic Alliance, since inter alia 
there is no communist representation, which is 
possible because of its rather vague statutes, the 
European Parliament will no longer ensure a 
permanent link with the parliaments of member 
countries when it is elected by direct suffrage. 
53. On the other hand, the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe and conse-
quently the WEU Assembly are composed of 
delegations which are fairly representative of 
national parliaments. This i:s an essential aspect 
because no co-ordination of independent defence 
policies can be achieved other than through the 
national parliaments. Moreover, the A:ssembly 
has received its responsibilities from the modified 
Brussels Treaty itself. Since it receives a 
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report from the Council, it is empowered to deal 
with all matters relating to European security. 
54. The. remarks of Mr. von Hassel, as reported 
in Die Welt of 1st August 1977, should thus be 
borne in mind. He warned against "the danger 
of the establishment of a nine-power European 
Parliament in the framework of the EEC leading 
to the other institutions created in Europe being 
shelved". 
55. It is not therefore its membership which 
hinders the work of the WEU Assembly but first 
and foremost the fact that its partner, the 
Council, is constantly evading its responsibilities, 
carefully providing only a strict minimum of 
information and avoiding any dialogue or 
debate, while at the same time pouring out a 
wealth of fine words to attenuate the Assembly's 
discontent. 
56 . .It is obvious that a clash is inevitable if 
the Assembly is generally anxious to apply the 
modified Brussels Treaty correctly whereas the 
Council's main concern is to apply it in the most 
restrictive manner possible. The Assembly's 
principal duty is therefore to inform public 
opinion by every means available to it of the 
Council's demise. 
57. But in order to widen its audience, the 
Assembly should follow in the wake of its Pre-
sident's encouragement and, throwing linguistic 
and diplomatic habits to the winds, tackle the 
essential fundamental problems of Europe's 
defence policy. Only too often has it confined 
itself to matters more technical than political, or 
skirted round the substance of debates by using 
procedural devices or by concealing deep-seated 
divergences behind unanimous votes. By endea-
vouring to reach the core of the subject, your 
Rapporteur does not expect to achieve unanimity 
on his report but hopes to open a debate in which 
fundamental problems will be tackled in full 
view of European public opinion. The danger 
threatening European parliamentarism is not 
differences of views but the camouflaging of such 
differences with fine words likely to obtain false 
majorities but which in the long run lead only 
to indifference and scepticism among public 
opinion. 
58. The WEU Assembly's responsibility is the 
defence of Western Europe in all its aspects: 
political, military, strategic, scientific and 
technical. Its means of action, faced with a 
defaulting Council, is to draw on public opinion 
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and to this end it must be clear in what it says, 
firm in its attitude and .steadfast in its require-
ments vis-a-vis the Couneil. 
VI. Conclusions 
59. At a time of such uncertainty regarding 
the future of Western Europe, as envisaged so 
far, and of NATO, the modified Brussels Treaty 
provides relatively firm ground because of the 
"automatic" nature of its Article V. WEU, 
having little support from advocates of a Euro-
pean defence community as of an Atlantic com-
munity, constitutes the minimum on which the 
member countries can agree in defence matters. 
It is there to ensure a permanent link between 
countries which cannot consider their security 
in isolation but yet do not share the same 
political, economic and social concepts and do 
not have the same concept of a defence policy 
based on deterrence. 
60. Furthermore, WEU offers a number of 
instruments which might prove most useful in a 
policy for "moralising" international relations 
in the manufacture and sale of arms and in the 
limitation of forces and control of armaments. 
At present, the use it makes of these instruments 
is too limited but the Assembly's efforts should 
be directed towards urging governments to meet 
their mutual undertakings· in full in order to 
achieve greater security no longer based solely 
on the accumulation of armaments but on 
mutual confidence, controlled disai'JIUl.IJlent and 
international co-operation. 
61. The institutional framework is not the only 
means offered by WEU for helping to prepare 
the future European union in fields within its 
competence. Of greater importance is its 
experience and fundamental work at the level 
of the Council and its technical bodies and of 
the Assembly. An attempt has been made in this 
report to define a number of lines of action 
which your Rapporteur proposes for WEU 
because he feels they are appropriate for a 
European union based on democracy and seeking 
to promote a little more peace and justice in 
Europe and throughout the world. Should the 
future European union come into being, it will 
not make its presence felt by breaking in new 
ground. On the contrary, it is by pursuing and 
organising work which can be started here and 
now in the framework of existing institutions 
that we can lay the foundations for tomorrow's 
Europe. 
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